Accessibility-tree injection safety

Instruction-shaped text in aria-labels and alt text is read by an agent as part of the page, and can be used to steer it.

Standard
Recommended

Who supports it

  • ClaudeSupported (announced)

    Published 25 Aug 2025 · last checked 9 Oct 2026: Claude blog: Piloting Claude in ChromeClaude in Chrome reads DOM content invisible to humans: 'hidden malicious form fields in a webpage's Document Object Model (DOM) invisible to humans ... URL text and tab title that only an agent might see.' Post updated through 2025-12-18. See also Use Claude in Chrome safely (support.claude.com/en/articles/12902428) and the browser use tool's injection classifiers.

  • CometPartial support

    Published 25 Nov 2025 · last checked 9 Oct 2026: BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents (Perplexity / Purdue, arXiv 2511.20597)Perplexity co-authored paper; benchmark built from Comet agent tool outputs. Hidden-injection strategies include 'HTML comment, data attribute, CSS-hidden text, form hidden fields, and semantic attribute abuse'. Not an explicit statement that aria-label/alt are passed to Comet.

  • Gemini in ChromeSupported (announced)

    Published 8 Dec 2025 · last checked 9 Oct 2026: Google blog: Architecting security for agentic capabilities in ChromeIndirect prompt injection 'can appear in malicious sites, third-party content in iframes, or from user-generated content'; Gemini plans from 'page content shared in Chrome'. Defences: User Alignment Critic, origin gating, confirmations. Does not say which attributes are included.

24 others: no evidence yet. See every agent and browser

What it checks

The extension reads the aria-label, alt, title and placeholder attributes on the rendered page and looks for text shaped like an instruction to an AI model. It matches phrases such as:

  • “ignore previous instructions” (or “prior”, “above”, “all previous”)
  • “disregard the above” or “disregard previous”
  • “system prompt”
  • “you are now …”
  • “new instructions:”

This check deliberately includes elements a person cannot see, such as zero-opacity or zero-size text, because that is how an instruction is hidden from people while staying readable to an agent. It only skips elements removed from the accessibility tree altogether (hidden, inert, aria-hidden="true", display: none or visibility: hidden), since an agent never sees those either.

Results

Status When
Pass No instruction-shaped text was found
Fail One or more attributes contain instruction-shaped text
Unmeasured The extension could not read the page (open it in the active tab)

The result quotes each matching attribute.

How to fix

Remove command-style text aimed at a reader from aria-label, alt, title and placeholder. These attributes should describe the element, not address whoever is reading the page.

If you did not put the text there, treat it as a security problem: look for injected content from user submissions, third-party widgets or a compromised plugin. Agents and the tools that protect them may flag the page as a prompt injection attempt.

Support by agent and browser

Announced means the vendor’s own docs or announcement say so. Published is the date on the vendor’s own page, where it has one. Checked is the last time our weekly research found that page still saying so.

AgentStatusSource
AI assistants
Claude AnthropicSupported (announced)

Claude blog: Piloting Claude in Chrome Published · Checked Claude in Chrome reads DOM content invisible to humans: 'hidden malicious form fields in a webpage's Document Object Model (DOM) invisible to humans ... URL text and tab title that only an agent might see.' Post updated through 2025-12-18. See also Use Claude in Chrome safely (support.claude.com/en/articles/12902428) and the browser use tool's injection classifiers.

AI browsers
Comet PerplexityPartial support

partial BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents (Perplexity / Purdue, arXiv 2511.20597) Published · Checked Perplexity co-authored paper; benchmark built from Comet agent tool outputs. Hidden-injection strategies include 'HTML comment, data attribute, CSS-hidden text, form hidden fields, and semantic attribute abuse'. Not an explicit statement that aria-label/alt are passed to Comet.

Gemini in Chrome GoogleSupported (announced)

Google blog: Architecting security for agentic capabilities in Chrome Published · Checked Indirect prompt injection 'can appear in malicious sites, third-party content in iframes, or from user-generated content'; Gemini plans from 'page content shared in Chrome'. Defences: User Alignment Critic, origin gating, confirmations. Does not say which attributes are included.

No evidence yet24
  • ChatGPT
  • Gemini
  • Perplexity
  • Copilot
  • Meta AI
  • ChatGPT Atlas
  • Dia
  • Edge Copilot Mode
  • Claude Code
  • Cursor
  • Codex
  • GitHub Copilot
  • Windsurf
  • CCBot
  • Applebot
  • Amazonbot
  • Bytespider
  • Cohere
  • Mistral
  • DuckAssist
  • Chrome
  • Edge
  • Firefox
  • Safari

Adoption on the top 100 sites

100 of 100 measured sites implement it

Scanned 23 Oct 2026 with the Sitebulb Labs extension, against the Tranco list (tranco-56Z8N).

9 Oct 2026: 100%12 Oct 2026: 100%23 Oct 2026: 100%
9 Oct 2026 100% → 23 Oct 2026 100%
Sites implementing it100
  1. #1 google.com
  2. #2 cloudflare.com
  3. #3 aws.amazon.com (via amazonaws.com)
  4. #4 facebook.com
  5. #5 gstatic.com
  6. #8 googleapis.com
  7. #9 microsoft.com
  8. #11 youtube.com
  9. #12 apple.com
  10. #13 instagram.com
  11. #15 mail.ru
  12. #16 x.com (via twitter.com)
  13. #18 linkedin.com
  14. #20 dzen.ru
  15. #23 googletagmanager.com
  16. #24 azure.microsoft.com (via azure.com)
  17. #26 m365.cloud.microsoft (via office.com)
  18. #27 outlook.live.com (via live.com)
  19. #29 amazon.com
  20. #32 github.com
  21. #33 wikipedia.org
  22. #37 fastly.com (via fastly.net)
  23. #39 whatsapp.com (via whatsapp.net)
  24. #42 bing.com
  25. #43 netflix.com
  26. #44 triplinkintl.com
  27. #45 googleusercontent.com
  28. #48 gandi.net
  29. #50 marketingplatform.google.com (via doubleclick.net)
  30. #52 uk.pinterest.com (via pinterest.com)
  31. #53 icloud.com
  32. #55 wordpress.org
  33. #56 teams.live.com (via skype.com)
  34. #57 cloudflare.net
  35. #59 goo.gl
  36. #60 digicert.com
  37. #61 adobe.com
  38. #63 tiktok.com
  39. #67 domains.google (via googledomains.com)
  40. #68 zoom.com (via zoom.us)
  41. #69 uk.yahoo.com (via yahoo.com)
  42. #70 sso.myfritz.net (via myfritz.net)
  43. #71 endpoints.news
  44. #72 api.whatsapp.com (via wa.me)
  45. #75 roblox.com
  46. #76 opera.com
  47. #77 open.spotify.com (via spotify.com)
  48. #80 baidu.com
  49. #81 tiktokv.com
  50. #83 ya.ru (via yandex.net)
  51. #84 nginx.org
  52. #85 ntp.org
  53. #86 msn.com
  54. #87 qq.com
  55. #90 vimeo.com
  56. #91 primevideo.com (via amazonvideo.com)
  57. #93 bunny.net (via b-cdn.net)
  58. #94 blogger.com (via blogspot.com)
  59. #95 mozilla.org
  60. #96 f5.com
  61. #98 telegram.org (via t.me)
  62. #99 store.epicgames.com (via epicgames.com)
  63. #101 wordpress.com
  64. #103 reddit.com
  65. #106 sentry.io
  66. #107 letsencrypt.org (via lencr.org)
  67. #109 ui.com
  68. #110 european-union.europa.eu (via europa.eu)
  69. #112 chatgpt.com
  70. #114 st.okcdn.ru (via okcdn.ru)
  71. #116 bitly.com (via bit.ly)
  72. #117 ipify.org
  73. #119 nic.ru
  74. #120 samsung.com
  75. #121 office365.com
  76. #122 intuit.com
  77. #123 aliyuncs.com
  78. #127 openai.com
  79. #128 one.one.one.one (via cloudflare-dns.com)
  80. #130 registrar-servers.com
  81. #131 pages.github.com (via github.io)
  82. #132 dropbox.com
  83. #133 skybridge.click
  84. #135 discord.com (via discord.gg)
  85. #136 developer.adobe.com (via adobe.io)
  86. #139 apache.org
  87. #140 android.com
  88. #141 nih.gov
  89. #144 vk.ru
  90. #147 reg.ru
  91. #150 t-online.de
  92. #151 archive.org
  93. #152 forms.gle
  94. #153 webex.com
  95. #154 snapchat.com
  96. #156 godaddy.com
  97. #158 kaspersky.co.uk (via kaspersky.com)
  98. #159 firebase.google.com (via crashlytics.com)
  99. #160 tumblr.com
  100. #161 nytimes.com

Overview

5/9

Gaining traction

Real support exists and adoption is growing.

How this rating is worked out5 of 9 points
FactorPointsWhy
Vendor support2 / 32 vendors supporting, 1 partly or planned
Top-100 adoption3 / 3100% of measured sites
Spec maturity0 / 3Community proposal

8 or more points is Established, 5 to 7 is Gaining traction, 2 to 4 is Speculative and under 2 is Stalled. A feature is also Stalled when more vendors have said no than yes. Read the spec.

Community insights

No community insights for this feature yet.

Quotes are from public posts, checked against the original before they appear here. Suggest an insight, or ask for yours to be removed.